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ABSTRACT 
We conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of $10 to a 
respondent, who accepts or rejects it. If an offer is rejected, players receive a known 
outside option. Our proposers made simultaneous offers to two respondents, with outside 
options of $2 and $4. The rate of rejected offers was higher than in similar studies, around 
50%, and persisted across five trials. Outside options seem to make players 
"egocentrically" apply different interpretations of the amount being divided, which creates 
persistent disagreement. And half of respondents demand more when they know other 
respondents are being offered more. 
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I. Introduction 
Previous experiments on bargaining have shown that many players are willing to reject 
final offers which are profitable but which they consider unfair. Much of the recent 
research uses "ultimatum" games, in which one "proposer" player offers a division of a 
fixed sum to another "respondent", who accepts or rejects it. Roth (1995) and Camerer & 
Thaler (1995) review recent literature; a very brief summary is given here. 
The typical finding is that respondents reject a substantial fraction of low offers (the 
mean rejected offer is around 20% of the amount being divided) and proposers make rather 
generous offers, around 40% on average. There are several statistically significant effects 
which are modest in size, moving average offers by 5-10%, from procedural variables like 
subject anonymity, instruction wording and context, whether proposers earn their position 
by winning a contest, whether high-profit proposers compete for the right to play a second 
ultimatum game, etc. There are similar effects, perhaps smaller and less reliable overall, 
from demographic variables like national background, gender, race, student major, etc. 
Raising the stakes, from $5 to $ 100, does not seem to affect offers or acceptances much 
(they are similar in percentage terms; two of nine subjects in one study rejected $30 offers 
from a $100 pie) . Playing the game repeatedly-- pairing players together only once, to 
minimize reputation-building-- appears to have little effect. 
When pie sizes are unknown to respondents, proposers make lower offers and 
respondents accept lower offers. In addition, respondents accept less when uneven offers 
are generated by a random device than when equally uneven offers are generated by a 
proposer; respondents appear to punish self-serving unfairness rather than reject uneven 
allocations, per se. 
Our paper extends this work on ultimatum bargaining in two ways. 
1 . Players had positive "outside options": Even if ultimatum offers were rejected, the
proposer and respondent both earned known amounts of money. 1  The presence of these 
1Giving each respondent different outside options creates an objective reason for the proposer to treat the
respondents differently, setting the stage for a social comparison effect. 
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outside options turned out to have a striking, and surprising effect: Nearly half the offers 
were rejected, compared to 5-25% in previous studies. The robustness of this outside 
options effect was explored by including options in both three- and two-person 
experiments, and allowing five trials of learning in some sessions. High rejection rates 
persisted. The introduction of outside options seems to create frequent rejections, perhaps 
by causing players to self-servingly disagree about what constitutes a fair offer. 
2. We extended the domain of most previous studies, two-person bargaining, to three 
players. The results of two-player studies suggest that respondents compare their own 
payoffs with the greater payoffs of the proposer. Since they care about comparative 
payoffs-- they dislike earning less-- as well as absolute payoffs (Loewenstein, Thompson, 
Bazerman 1989; Bolton 1991), or they are willing to punish a player they feel has behaved 
unfairly (Rabin 1993), they prefer getting nothing to accepting a small offer if the proposer 
gets a lot more. This interpretation jibes with well-known theories of social evaluation 
which argue that a player's satisfaction is influenced by the "social comparison" of one's 
outcome with the outcome of others thought to be similar (e.g. Vroom 1968; Goodman 
1977; Bazerman, 1993). 
To learn more about these social comparison processes, we study three-player games in 
which a single proposer makes simultaneous offers to each of two respondents. Each 
ultimatum game is formally independent because a respondent's decision to accept or reject 
an offer does not affect the other respondent's decision or monetary payoff. This design 
tests whether social comparison also occurs between respondents, as it seems to occur 
between a respondent and a proposer. The 3-player design represents a minimal extension 
aimed mostly at those who are unfamiliar with the social comparison literature or skeptical 
of such effects. 2 There are many nuances of social compruison that could be explored in 
further research. 
2A related motivation is that organizational scholars cite results of ultimatum games as suggesting that
fairness is important in some economic exchanges that occur in organizations (e.g Bazerman, 1993). 
Extending this insight, a better understanding of the connection between the preference for fair offers 
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The results of the experiments show that there is a modest social comparison effect for 
about half of the respondents: Generally, they reject offers more frequently if they are 
offered less than the other respondent is. But proposers do not adjust their offers in 
anticipation of this between-respondent social comparison. 
II. Experimental Design
In the standard ultimatum game a proposer and a respondent split an amount of money 
S. The proposer makes an offer X ::::; S to the respondent. If the respondent accepts then 
the proposer receives S - X, and the proposer receives X. If the respondent rejects the 
offer then both players receive $0. 
We conducted 20 3-player ultimatum games with undergraduate students at the 
University of Chicago. Each player participated in two rounds with the same partners. The 
first round is essentially a within-subject control group used to evaluate the effect of 
between-respondent comparison in the second round. The experiments followed these 
steps (see the Appendix for actual instructions) : 
Round 1 (No between-respondent comparison) 
Step lA: A proposer makes two offers X1 e [$0, $.50, ... , $10] and X2e [$0, $.50, ... ,
$10] to respondent 1 (Rl) and respondent 2 (R2), respectively. The proposer's outside 
option in each of the two ultimatum games (the amount she earns if an offer is rejected) is 
$3.00. 
Step lB: While the proposer is determining her two offers each respondent determines 
the minimum offer he is willing 10 accept (denoted WTA). Rl has an outside option of 
exhibited by respondents in ultimatum games and behavior in organizational contexts requires richer games 
that are more like complicated organizations. Three-player games take a small step in this direction. 
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$2.00 and R2 has an outside option of $4.00. They indicate WT As by circling the 
minimum offer they would accept from a column of numbers, ranging from $2 to $7 for 
Rl and $4 to $7 for R2 (in $.50 increments). Note that by restricting the range of 
permissible WTAs, respondents are forced to accept nothing less than their outside option, 
and to accept nothing more than the maximum a self-interested proposer would offer. 
(Since the proposer's option is $3 she shouldn't offer more than $7). 
Step lC: When all three subjects are finished the proposer's offers are conveyed to their 
respective respondents. If Rl accepts X 1 then he receives X 1 and the proposer receives 
$10 - X 1. If Rl rejects the offer then he receives $2 and the proposer receives $3. 
Similarly, if R2 accepts X2 then he receives X2 while the proposer receives $10 - X2. If 
R2 rejects the offer then he receives $4 and the proposer receives $3. 
The value of each subject's outside option is common knowledge. Note that in this first 
round each respondent does not know the offer made to the other respondent, so no 
between-respondent comparison is possible. And the proposer does not learn if her offers 
have been accepted or rejected until after the second round. 
Round 2 (Between-respondent comparison possible) 
In round 2 the same three subjects play the 3-player ultimatum game. Each has the same 
role and outside option. The key procedural difference from round 1 is that the 
respondents state WT A's which can depend on the offer made to the other respondent, and 
this fact is common knowledge. The only change in experimental procedure is in the 
second step, when respondents record WT As: 
Step 2B: Each respondent states a WT A conditional on each of the possible offers made 
to the other respondent. Respondents circle one number each in a series of columns, where 
each column heading gives a possible offer to the other respondent (see Table Al in the 
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Instructions Appendix). If a respondent does not care how much was offered to the other 
respondent, he or she will circle the same number in each column. 
After the two rounds are concluded, a coin is flipped to determine which one of the two 
rounds will be used to determine each subject's payoffs. 
Special features of the design 
Since ultimatum results are sensitive to many aspects of experimental design, some 
remarks about special features of the design are necessary. 
1. Members of a three-subject bargaining group were nQt anonymous. While subjects
only communicated with one another through their offers and WTAs (as described above) 
each subject could look around the room and see the other two subjects they were grouped 
with. We did this because we thought the social comparison effect might be small under 
standard anonymity conditions, and larger if subjects could see each other, and we wanted 
to give social comparison its best chance to appear. Some two-player games with single­
blind anonymity (subjects did not see who they were paired with) are described below; they 
suggest the lack of anonymity made much difference. 
2. The order of rounds was not counterbalanced. The social comparison round 2, in
which respondents made WT A's conditional on offers to other respondents, always came 
after the no-social comparison round 1 (which then serves as a within-subject control 
group). The order was not reversed because the social comparison round seemed likely to 
be more confusing. A control group of subjects participating in the social comparison 
round first, or only in the social comparison round, would establish whether there was a 
treatment effect in the results we observe from playing the no-social comparison round 
first. 
3. The experiments used the "strategy method" in which respondents were asked to
select strategies for each possible moves of the other player in the game (in the form of 
WTAs). The strategy method gives more information, pmticularly about the between-
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respondent comparison which is our central focus. Like many, we think stating WT As may 
lead subjects to reject larger offers than the alternative method, in which respondents face 
specific offers, but we leave this topic to future research (though see Camerer and Knez, 
1995). 
4. Our design departs from earlier ultimatum research by adding a second respondent
and outside options (which are asymmetric); in addition, the strategy method is used to 
elicit WT As. Readers may wonder why we made all these changes at once. There are 
three answers: First, many of the changes work hand in hand. The strategy method is 
necessary to efficiently produce data which are informative about social comparison in the 
3-player case. (Facing subjects with specific offers would not create enough data to judge 
reliably how acceptances vary with different offers to others.) The use of asymmetric 
outside options, instead of symmetric ones, is essential for testing whether proposers 
realize respondents are comparing their own payoffs (hypothesis C' below). 
Second, we thought adding one feature at a time was too conservative and time­
consuming. If all these simultaneous changes still produce standard results, we can guess 
that none of the changes are substantial (assuming their effects do not work in opposite 
directions and cancel) and move on. Since the results are llill standard-- WT As are larger 
than offers and rejection rates are high-- we are left wondering which specific changes 
cause the departures. One step is taken backward toward answering this question in 
section V by reverting to a standard 2-player design and adding asymmetric outside 
options. 
Third, moving from two players to three necessarily opens a (small) Pandora's box of 
design choices: Should the respondents behave independently? Together? If together, 
should they respond simultaneously or sequentially? So running a thorough set of 3-player 
experiments, even neglecting outside options, requires either a very large design or narrow 
choices. Since no particular treatment seems a better place to start than the others, we 
picked one and added options as well. 
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III. Hypotheses
The data produced by each triple of subjects (proposer, Rl, and R2) is a pair of 
observations, one in each round. Each observation consists of two offers by the proposer 
(to Rl and R2) and two WT A functions. In the first round, the WT A function for each 
respondent is simply a demand (the minimum acceptable offer); in the second round, the 
WT A may specify a different demand for each possible offer to the other respondent. 
Three sets of hypotheses, and predictions they imply, will serve as benchmarks against 
which to compare results. The hypotheses assume self-interest (S), faimess (F), and social 
comparison (C). Each hypothesis about basic preferences or knowledge, coupled with 
trembling-hand perfection or iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, leads 
directly to predictions about offers and WT As. 
Self-interest and knowledge of self-interest: 
Hypothesis S :  Respondents are purely self-interested3 
=> WTA 1 = $2.50, WTA2 = 4.50. 
Hypothesis S' :  Proposer believes S and Proposer is purely self-interested 
=> X 1 = $2.50, X2 = $4.50. 
The two hypotheses are stated separately because one might be true and the other false, and 
our data enable us to test that possibility. For example, proposers could be self-interested 
and think respondents are too (S' holds), so they make small offers. But if respondents are 
not purely self-interested (S is faise) then small offers will be rejected often. 
The second two hypotheses, following Loewenstein, Bazerman & Thompson (1989), 
Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), and others, express the possibility that players dislike low 
3For simplicity, we assume respondents will not accept offers equal to their outside options, and proposers
know this, though a few do state WTAs equal to their outside options (as Table� 1 -2 show). 
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relative payoffs or being treated unfairly and therefore proposers make generous offers and 
respondents reject small offers. 
Fairness and knowledge of fairness: 
Hypothesis F: Respondents dislike negative relative payoffs between themselves and the 
proposer => WTA1 (XI)� $2.50, WTA2 (X2) � 4.50. 
Hypothesis F': Proposers dislike negative relative payoffs between themselves and the 
respondent =>XI� $2.50, X2 � 4.50. 
Hypothesis F": Proposer is self-interested but believes F 
=>XI� $2.50, X2 � $4.50. 
Note that hypotheses F' and F" are fundamentally different-- F' posits fair-minded 
proposers, and F" posits strategic proposers who believe respondents are fair-minded--
but are observationally equivalent. Our design cannot discriminate between these 
hypotheses but a large literature tries to do so, mostly using "dictator" games (e.g., 
Forsythe et al 1994), and reports mixed results.4 
The next two hypotheses express the possibility that respondents compare their payoffs 
with those of other respondents, as well as with the proposer's payoff. 
Between-respondent social comparison, and knowledge of social compadson: 
Hypothesis C: Respondents care about relative payoffs between themselves and the other 
respondent => WTAi(Xi,Xj) is increasing in Xj, i = 1,2, i "# j. 
4Researchers have tested F' versus F" in dictator games in which proposers make offers that cannot be
rejected. If F' is true offers will be generous: if F" is true offers will be zero. Since dictator offers are clearly 
lower than ultimatum offers, and close to zero in some conditions, researchers have concluded that F" is 
true, and is presumably true in ultimatum games too. But note that standards of fair behavior may vary 
across dictator and ultimatum games. For example, proposers may shift somewhat from F' in dictator 
games to F" in ultimatum games, because proposers feel obligated to treat respondents fairly in dictator 
games but feel free to behave self-interestedly in ultimatum games, because respondents can stick up for 
themselves in utimatums. If this is true, then data supporting F' in dictators is of little relevance for testing 
F' versus F" in ultimatums. Then F" would have to be tested directly by eliciting proposers' beliefs about 
the distribution of WT As to see if ultimatum offers are expected-profit-maximizing given their beliefs. 
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Hypothesis C': Proposer believes C 
:=} X2(l) - X1(l) .C X2(2) - X1(2), 
where Xi(t) is the offer made to respondent i =1,2 in stage t = 1,2. 
Hypothesis C states that each respondent's WT A increases in the offer made to the other 
respondent, because respondents dislike earning less than other respondents do. The 
prediction is consistent with theories of social comparison based on similarity of 
"referents" (see Goodman, 1977). Since respondents 1 and 2 are in similar roles (relative 
to the proposer) they will use the offer the other respondent receives as a point of 
comparison in determining the fairness of the offer they receive. Note that hypothesis C 
could be true for different reasons. Respondents could be envious of other respondents 
(and require higher offers to appease their envy). Or respondents could think that 
proposers are behaving unfairly, and hence deserve punishment by having a higher offer of 
X rejected, if they offer X to one respondent but not another. Other preferences underlying 
hypothesis C could be imagined. The first step is to see if the social comparison hypothesis 
C is true. If it is, further research could try to distinguish different reasons underlying the
effect.5 
If the proposer believes C, then he or she should reduce the difference between the 
respondent offers in round 2 in order to lower the risk of rejection and increase expected 
profit, leading to hypothesis C'. (Note that we assume Xl <X2, which is always true in 
our data). Note that we used asymmetric outside options to create a sensible reason why 
offers might differ in round 1, in ·order to create an offer gap that proposers obeying 
hypothesis C' would reduce in round 2. 
IV. Experimental Results: 3-player games
5 For example, a referee suggested a 4-person design in which two 2-player ultimatum games are played,
but respondent 1 can condition her WTA on the offer to respondent 2. In this design, a between-respondent 
effect is due to pure envy, rather than the desire to punish an unfair proposer, because each respondent only 
gets offers from a different proposer. In our design envy and unfairness could both produce comparison. 
10 
A. Between-respondent Social Comparison: Round 2 Results 
WIAs: The analysis begins by looking at round 2 results, which capture any between­
respondent social comparison because respondents can condition their WT As on offers 
made to the other respondent. Each respondent's conditional WT As are described in tables 
1 (for Rl) and 2 (R2). Each row of tablel gives the conditional WT A of one of the twenty
subjects in the role of Rl, and each column represents a potential offer made to R2. For 
example, the minimum offer subject 1 will accept if R2 receives an offer of $4.00 is $3.50, 
while the minimum offer he will accept if R2 receives an offer of $7.00 is $6.50. 
The social comparison effect (hypothesis C) predicts that respondents' stated WT A's are 
increasing in the off er made to the other respondent. The far right column gives the slope 
of each subject's conditional WT A function, b, fitted with an ordinary least-squares 
regression of conditional WT A on offer-to-other-respondent, WT A 1 (X1 ,X2)=a+bX2+e. 
Hypothesis C predicts a positive slope b. 
Entries in the table are ordered by the estimate of b. Seven of the 20 Rls-- the first 
seven rows of Table 1-- exhibit a substantial social comparison effect (b�.5); 1 1  of the 20 
subjects are completely indifferent to R2's offer (b=O). 
Table 2 gives the conditional WTA's for the respondent R2s. Orily five subjects (the top 
five rows) display a strictly positive social comparison slope. Several, at the bottom of the 
table, appear to have ne�ative slopes: If Rl 's are offered less, they demand more. Five 
subjects are completely indifferent. 
Interestingly, on average the R2s appear to care negatively about.social comparison with 
Rl in some range of offers, and positively in others. For example, subject 7 demanded $6 
if $3.50-$4.50 was offered to Rl, but raised his demand to $7 if Rl was offered less than 
$3.50 or more than $4.50. This can still be social comparison, with the focus of 
comparison switching for very low and high offers to Rl: When the offer to Rl is low the 
proposer gets more; R2 subjects compare their offers with the proposer's total share from 
the two games and demand some of the proposer's windfall. When the offer to Rl is high, 
1 1  
R2s compare themselves with the well-off Rl and also demand more. Note that this dual­
comparison account predicts a U-shaped pattern of WTAs (across Rl offer levels), which 
is only apparent for two subjects (subjects 6-7 in Table 2). But since many subjects seem 
to care about Rl 's high offers, and others care about the proposer taking advantage of Rl 
with a low offer, a composite of these subjects creates a U-shaped pattern in the ayera&e 
WTA. 
This interpretation of the differing results for Rl and R2 may sound convoluted. We 
think the results are complicated because there are two natural foci for comparison-- the 
other respondent, and the proposer. Differing option values for Rl and R2 allow foci to 
differ between them, and in ways that vary with offers. If the data are consistent with a 
single organizing principle, perhaps it is this: Subjects dislike negative relative payoffs 
(and raise their WTAs as compensation), and compute relative payoffs by compming their 
absolute payoff with the payoff of the player whose absolute earnings are closest to theirs. 
For Rls, the referent is usually R2 and we observe positive slopes or zero slopes in the 
regression results. For R2s, the referent is the proposer when the offer to Rl is low and 
R2 when her offer is high. (Note that adding more respondents, with various option 
values, would provide an interesting test of how well this general principle predicts.) 
Another way to measure the effect of social comparison is by studying the rate of 
rejection of a particular offer-- say, an offer to Rl-- conditional on the offer to R2. Figures 
1 and 2 give the conditional rejection rates for Rls and R2s, respectively. Conditional 
rejection rates were calculated by determining the probability that an offer would be rejected 
given a specific offer made to the other respondent. For example, in Figure 1 ,  if an off er 
of $4.50 is made to respondent 2, then there is a 50 percent chance that an offer of $3.50 to 
respondent 1 will be rejected. Increasing conditional rejection rates are consistent with a 
social comparison effect between respondents. The biggest effect occurs for offers of 
$3.50 or $4.00. For each of these cases a $.50 increase in the offer made to respondent 2 
leads to a roughly 10 percent increase in the rejection rate. 
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The conditional rejection rates for R2s, shown in Figure 2, show much less social 
comparison effect. The social comparison effect does not kick in unless Rl receives offers 
greater than R2. For example, if R2 receives an offer of $5.50, then an increase in Rl's 
offer from $5.50 to $6.00 doubles the rejection rate from about 15% to 30%. Finally, the 
downward sloping rejection rates at relatively high offers to R2, but low offers to Rl, 
again suggests that the R2s are making relative comparisons at that point between 
themselves and the proposer, not Rl. 
In sum: Tables 1-2 suggest that about half the respondents care about other respondents' 
offers, and Rls and R2s are apt to make different types of social comparisons when 
determining their WTA's. Rls can be roughly divided into two groups: Half do not care 
about R2's offer at all (b=O); several others do care, and demand more when R2 is offered 
more (b>O). R2's can be roughly divided into those two groups as well-- five don't care 
(b=O) and six demand more when Rl gets more (b>O)-- and there is a third group of six or 
so who compare themselves to proposers when Rl's offer is low (b<O). Overall, there is 
mixed evidence for hypothesis C: 
Psychologists have expressed surprise at how little social comparison our data show, 
compared to other studies (e.g. , Bazerman, Loewenstein & White 1992). There are three 
replies to this conclusion. First, note that a small majority (60%) do exhibit some apparent 
social comparison. Second, the high WT As indicate a very strong apparent comparison 
between respondents and proposers. The strength of this proposer-i'espondent comparison 
may divert respondents' attention away from comparisons with other respondents, or limit 
how large the between-respondent effect could be. Third, our rating scale expresses WTAs 
to the nearest $.50. Subjects who care a little bit about other respondents' offers (less than 
$.50 variation in their own WTA) will look as if they do not care at all, so our method 
understates the number of subjects who do social comparison. 
Offers: Figure 3 gives a three-dimensional histogram showing the frequency of offer­
pairs (X1 ,X2) made in round 2. On average, proposers offered $3.78 to Rl and $5.08 to 
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R2. The mode is the self-interest point (2.50, 4.50), with six of twenty pairs (which is a 
very large number of self-interested offers compared to other studies). Four proposers 
offered both respondents equal splits (5,5). 
It is useful to compare these actual offers with the offers that proposers should have 
made if they (i) self-interestedly strove to maximize their own expected profits; and (ii) 
knew the actual distributions of WT As. The level of expected profits for each possible 
offer-pair is displayed in figure 4. The optimal offer-pair is shown by the tallest box, at 
($5, $5). Note that offering too little to respondents lowers expected payoffs (the bars get 
shorter) because rejection is likely; offering too much lowers expected payoffs because it 
lowers the proposer's share. 
Comparing Figures 3 and 4, it is clear that many proposers erred on the side of self­
interest, choosing lower offers yielding lower expected profits (about $ 1  less) than the 
profit-maximizing equal split ($5,$5). This result is unusual because many previous 
studies show that offers are very close to the expected-profit-maximizing point, even in the 
first period of repeated play (e.g. Roth et al 1991).6 Since the three-player game with 
options is more complicated than in earlier studies, one might argue that proposers of 
limited rationality cannot figure out how to profit-maximize. But note that the profit­
maximizing offer pair is as simple as can be-- off er two equal splits. 
Comparin& round 1 and round 2 offers: Recall that the analysis of Tables 1 -2 showed 
mixed evidence for the social comparison hypothesis C. Proposers who anticipated this 
result, obeying hypothesis C', should reduce the difference in the offers made to the two 
respondents in round 2, relative to round 1 ,  because in round 2 the respondents' know 
each others' offers and are more likely to reject offers that are far apart. In fact, hypothesis 
C' is rejected because the round 1 and 2 offers are very close together. Ten proposers 
6 A referee suggested subjects may be viewing the 3-player ultimatum game as a single game between the
proposers and the two respondents combined. Under this interpretation the equal-split implies the proposer 
receives a total of $10.00 and the remaining $10.00 is somehow divided between the two respondents. In 
round 1 eight of the twenty offers are consistent with this hypothesis, and five out of twenty are consistent 
in round 2. However, all these offer pairs are (5,5) or (4,6), which are about equally common in the two­
player experiments we report in section N. 
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made exactly the same offers in the two rounds. Five others made different offers, but 
changed Rl and R2's offers by the same amount. The statistic for testing hypothesis C',the 
difference in offer gaps, [X2(l)-X1(l)]-[X2(2)-X1 (2)], has a mean of -.025 (t=-. 16).7 
B. Round 1 Offers and WTAs 
In round 1 ,  respondents gave a single WTA and did not know what other respondents 
were offered, so between-respondent social comparison is controlled away. Round 1 
offers were used in the last section as a control for whether proposers alter their round 2 
offers in anticipation of social coinparison. The round 1 data are also interesting because 
our design includes positive outside options, which previous ultimatum studies did not. 8 
From the perspective of orthodox game theory, if the self-interest hypotheses S and S' 
are true the only effect of positive outside options should be to raise offers by the amount 
of the respondent's option. Respondents should accept any positive level of surplus rather 
than exercising their outside options. Proposers, anticipating this, should off er a minimal 
amount above the respondents' options. 
The left two data columns of Table 3 give summary statistics for offers and WT As, for 
Rl and R2, from round 1 .  For Rl s the mean WT A of $3. 86 is greater than the mean offer 
7 A referee points out that each responder's WTA in period 2 may be affected by the offer they observe in 
period 1 .  In order to test for such an effect we can compare each respondent's first round WT A with their 
second round WT A, for those respondents whose WT As in round 2 are independent of the offer made to the 
other respondent (i.e. the state the same WT A for each of the possible offers made to the other respondents). 
This is of course not a perfect test since there may be a level effect in round 2 which is independent of the 
first round offer. Pooling across respondent 1 's and respondent 2's yields sixteen cases of players stating the 
same round 2 WTA for each of the possible offers made to the other respondents. In five of these cases 
respondents rejected the first round offer. Three of these subjects stated the same WTA in round 2, and two 
lowered their WT As. Eleven accepted round 1 offers; of those, eight stated the same WT A and two lowered 
theirs. Hence, there is a modest, insignificant, relation between round 1 acceptance/rejection and lowering 
WT As. Also, if we regress WT A in round 2 on offer in round 1 for the same subsample as above there is 
no relationship (t=-.043). 
8Binmore, Shaked & Sutton (1989) also studied the influence of outside options in alternating-offer 
bargaining and found that with some experience, subjects learned to ignore options if and only if, in 
equilibrium, they would not be exercised. It is hard to know whether options increase disagreement in their 
setting because there is not a large body of no-option evidence to compare their data with. 
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of $3.63, leading to a rejection rate of 45%.9 For R2s the mean WT A of $5.28 is again 
greater than the mean offer of $4.90, creating 55% rejections.  Hypotheses S and S '  are 
clearly rejected in the direction of the fairness hypotheses F and F' or F". 
The fact that respondents ask for more than proposers offer, on average, is remarkable; 
no other ultimatum study reports mean WT As consistently above mean offers. The result is 
that rejection rates are very high, around 50%, roughly double the rejection rates of 5-30% 
or so observed in previous experiments. 
Egocentric assessments of fairness: Our interpretation is that average WT As exceed 
average offers, and rejection rates around 50% result, because the presence of outside 
options cause players to have differing "egocentric" interpretations of what offer is fair. 
For example, suppose for sake of argument that both the proposer and respondent 
(implicitly) agree that it is fair for the respondent to get, say, 35% of the surplus being 
divided Focus on respondent 1 (with the $2 option) for simplicity. Because of the outside 
options, there are two ways to define surplus and compute the fair offer. If the surplus to 
be divided is $10.00, then the respondent should receive $3.50. Alternatively, the surplus 
could be defined as the gains from exchange above and beyond the option values, which is 
$ 10-$2-$3 or $5. Then the fair offer is 35% of $5 beyond Rl's $2 option, a total of 
$3 .75 .  
Note that the two "frames" or interpretations of surplus are both plausible (cf. Binmore, 
Shaked & Sutton 1989). Players could reasonably have preferences over which way to 
view the situation and hence, over what is fair. If players egocentrically choose the view 
which benefits them most, proposers will pick the $10 surplus definition and offer $3.50; 
respondents will pick the $5 definition and ask for $3.75. These numbers match fairly 
closely the mean offers and WTAs observed in our experiment ($3.63 and $3.86) .  (Of 
course, the 35% figure was picked to fit the data, but note that the mean offer and mean 
9The rejection rate is measured by pairing every offer with every other WT A, so it may be slightly different 
than the empirical rejection rate (which paired one offer with exactly one WTA). But since subjects had no 
opportunity to learn from direct experience, this difference shouldn't matter. 
· 
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WT A, two statistics, were closely fit by using just one parameter and the obvious two 
ways to define surplus.) 
Figure 510 shows histograms of offers and WTAs which illustrate in more detail how 
egocentric interpretations of fairness could account for the surprisingly high rejection rate. 
For Rl (top histogram) nearly half the respondents demanded $5 of the $ 10 pie, or $4.50, 
but only a third of the proposers offered that much. A large cluster of proposers offered 
$2.50-$3, just above Rl 's $2 option value, but few respondents were willing to accept that 
little. The same kind of shift is evident for R2, though less pronounced: For example, a 
third of respondents demanded more than half the $10 pie-- note that $5.50 is the equal 
split of the beyond-option surplus plus R2's option-- but only 10% of the proposers 
offered that much. 
So if proposers and respondents roughly agree on what percentage offer is fair, but self­
servingly pick the definition of surplus which benefits them most, then a significant 
disparity in offers and WT As follows, and high rejection rates. This effect was not 
predicted, but it corroborates many other studied documenting egocentric assessments of 
fairness (some are mentioned below) and perhaps deserves further study. 
V: Experimental results: 2-player games 
Because the level of rejection rates in these experiments was unusually high compared to 
earlier studies, it is natural to wonder whether the two-respondent structure, the presence of 
outside options, or some other unusual design feature (e.g., the lack of single-blind 
anonymity) was the source. So we ran a second set of experiments on 2-player ultimatum 
games with outside options using University of Chicago MBA students. Thitty 2-player 
games were conducted with the standard single-blind anonymity condition (subjects sat in a 
room, and knew they were paired with someone in the room but did not know who) and 
lOThe figure pools some statistically similar data from 2-person games, described below in section V. 
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the same conditions as our 3-player games (round 1), except each proposer makes an offer 
to only one respondent. 
The two-player results are summarized in the middle part of Table 3.  (The slightly 
different "POR games" are discussed separately, below.) Two-player offers are a little 
lower than in the 3-player case, and WT As are a bit more compressed between high- and 
low-option respondents Rl and R2. But the essential features of the three-player game 
results are the same: Mean and median WT As are still larger than offers, and rejection rates 
are still around 50%.1 1  
We use two nonparamettlc hypothesis tests to check for disttibutional differences 
between 2- and 3-player results: (i) The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, which uses the 
maximum difference in two sample cumulative disttibution functions as a test statistic (and 
is simple to compute and interpret); and (ii) the more complicated Epps-Singleton (1986) 
ES test (with J=2 and t=.4), which uses the empitical charactetlstic function and generally 
has more power than KS. (Forsythe et al, 1994, give helpful details and a useful 
comparison of these tests with two others.) Table 4 shows these two test statistics for the 
comparison between 2- and 3-pl�yer outcomes. Statistics for offers are shown in the upper 
right of each table and WTA statistics are shown in the lower left. Only the WTAs in the R2 
($4 option) condition differ significantly, by only one of the two tests (ES). 
POR condition: One procedural change was made in further two-player sessions, as a 
loose test of our egocenttic assessment interpretation of the high rejection rate. In the 3-
player expetlments and most 2-player sessions, respondents were asked to circle a WTA in 
the range of feasible offers circumscribed by the outside options (Rl picked a WT A from 
$2 to $7, and R2 from $4 to $7). But proposers were asked to simply wtlte down an 
11Note that in two cases proposers made $10.00 offers. One proposer told the experimenters that she did 
not completely understand the instructions, and hence, felt compelled to give the whole $10.00 away. There 
appears to have been a foreign language problem. These two offers were dropped from the analysis. 
Including them does not impact the results greatly; e.g., the median offers are the same. 
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offer.12 A referee suggested this procedure may encourage differing assessments of 
fairness because respondents see only a restricted range while proposers do not (and may 
think about the full $10 range). To test this, some sessions were run using a "proposer
offer range" (POR) treatment in which proposers made offers by circling a number from 
the feasible range, just as respondents did. If the offer range they are presented with 
influences players' preference for how to define surplus, then the POR treatment should 
make offers rise and rejections fall. 
The rightmost column of Table 3 shows the POR results. 13 POR offers do appear to be 
higher. The frequent offers of $2.50 and $3.00 observed in the standard condition, visible 
in the Figure 5 histogram, almost disappear in the POR treatment (one offers $2.50 and 
another $3.50) and the number of $4 offers rises sharply. Furthermore, the POR and 
pooled 2- and 3-player offer distributions are significantly different by the KS and ES tests 
(Table 4). 
The WT A's appear to be slightly lower in the POR games, but are insignificantly 
different from those in the 2- and.3-player games. The rejection rate in the POR treatment is 
still substantial, 38%. (If POR offers are matched with the higher two-player Rl WT As, 
averaging $4.27, the rejection rate rises to 44%.) The effect of POR shows that which 
surplus interpretation subjects use can, to some extent, be affected by experimental 
procedure. In effect, the POR treatment induces proposers to see the situation less 
egocentrically, more like respondents do, and raises offers. 
A purely economic explanation of high rejection rates is that subjects are not highly 
motivated to agree because the outside options mean that the marginal gain from an 
agreement is only $3 or $5, not $10. (Hence, a rejection is a less costly mistake in our 
games than in games with $10 pies and no options.) This explanation seems unlikely 
12w e allowed this difference because we did not want respondents to be confused about the role of their
outside options by making it look acceptable to select WTA's which were less than their outside options. 
We were less worried that proposers would be confused. 
13 We excluded two outlying $7 offers from the analysis of POR offers. The strength of our conclusions is
only increased by including them, except the rejection rate falls slightly. 
19 
because studies have varied actual pie sizes from $1 to $ 100 with little variation in rejection 
rates except for hypothetical-payoff sessions (see Hoffman et al in press). Nonetheless, a 
very careful control requires using our methods, subject pool, etc., with pie sizes of $5 
(corresponding to Rl surplus) and $3 (R2 surplus) and no options. If rejection rates are 
low in such an experiment, then we can conclude that the presence of outside options, not 
lower motivation due to reduction in surplus, cause high rejection rates.14 
VI. Experimental Results: Repetition and learning in 2-player games
It is natural to wonder whether the frequent disagreements our subjects exhibit are 
expressions of preference-- subje.cts don't mind losing money from disagreement because 
they think others are behaving unfairly-- or mistakes in judgment about what others will
do. If disagreement results from errors in judgment, the disagreement rate should shrink if 
the game is repeated, as subjects learn. Learning is tested in five-round games where 
subjects played the outside option ultimatum game with a new partner in each round. (The 
learning sessions used the original instructions rather than the POR instructions.) 
Three experimental sessions were conducted with ten subjects in each session. In each 
session five of the subjects were randomly assigned to be proposers and five of the 
subjects are randomly assigned to be respondents. Each session consisted of five rounds 
of play. In each round subjects would play the respondent 1 ultimatum game where the 
proposer has an outside option of $3.00 and the respondent has an outside option of $2.00. 
14 A weak control is reported by Camerer and Loewenstein (1993), who conducted a series of no-option
ultimatum bargaining experiments involving several pie sizes. On average, their subjects' offers from $3 
and $5 pies were $1 .34 and $2.23, compared to our results of $.66 and $1.80 (adjusting offers by 
subtracting respondent option values). Their average WTAs were $.85 and $1.46, compared to $.96 and 
$2.27. Our subjects offered less and asked more. (These differences are highly significant: A comparison of 
the pooled WTA and offer distributions for $2 options, or $5 pies, yields KS statistics of .49 and .40, both 
significant at p=.025, and ES statistics of 10.43, p<.05, and 1068, p<.001 .) As a result, our disagreement 
rates, 45% and 48% for $3 and $5 pies, were much higher than their rates of 15% and 14%. Their 
disagreement rates are very close to rates we observed with Chicago MB As in other $10 experiments 
without options (Camerer and Knez, 1995). Furthermore, we are virtually certain that a suitable control 
with a $5 pie and no options would yield a significantly different offer distribution, because the Camerer­
Loewenstein and Forsythe et all (1994) $5 pie data show 50-70% of the offers at the equal split $2.50, but 
only 2 of 35 offers (6%) in our option conditions were at the option-adjusted equivalent of $4.50. 
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Subjects remained in the same role throughout the five rounds of play, and were paired 
with a new partner in each round. Subjects never played with the same partner twice and 
this was common knowledge. At the end of each round respondents observed their offers, 
and proposers learned if their offers were accepted or rejected. Finally, at the end of the 
fifth round one of the five rounds was randomly selected as the round determining each 
subject's payoffs. 
Results of the learning trials are shown in Table 5. First note that average WT As and 
offers are roughly similar to those from the other sessions we have reported (compare 
Tables 3 and 5). Both the round 1 and round 5 results are statistically indistinguishable 
from the pooled 2- and 3-player Rl results (see Table 4). 
The primary question is whether WTA's fall over time or offers rise (or both), leading to 
an overall reduction in the rejection rate. Results are shown in Table 5. First note that the 
rejection rate of 47% in round 5 is identical to the rejection rate in round 1 ,  and is close to 
the 45% rejection rate observed ill our single-shot, Rl ultimatum games (see Table 3). So
five rounds of repetition do not lower the high rejection rate. However, the average offer 
rises steadily over time, from $3.43 in round 1 to $3.90 in round 5.  Under a paired­
comparison t-test this difference is significant (t=-2. 17, p<.025), and the two-sample tests 
indicates significantly different offers too (see Table 4) . .  In eighteen cases proposers 
increased their offers between rounds. In fifteen of these eighteen cases the proposer's 
offer was rejected in the previous round. 15 
While offers rise a bit over the five trials, there is no decrease in average WT As between 
rounds 1 and 5 (t=-.28, p>.38, and see Tabe 4). There are twelve cases where a 
respondent lowers his WT A, and in ten of these cases the respondent rejected the offer they 
received in the previous round. But in six of the twelve cases respondents later raise their 
WT As. Hence, respondents appear to stick more to their guns, or temporalily retreat, while 
15Tue increase in offers is consistent with results on repeated ultimatum games reported by Prasnikar and
Roth (1992). It would be interesting to know whether the learning dynamics can be captured with simple 
reinforcement or adaptive models, as in Roth & Erev (1995). 
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proposers slowly give in to the respondents' demands. It is natural to think that this 
asymmetry in learning occurs because a rejection usually costs a proposer more than it 
costs a respondent (cf. Roth & Erev 1995). The rate of change is too slow and erratic to 
lower the overall rejection rate of 50% within five periods, but it would be interesting to 
know whether many more periods of learning (e.g. 10-20) reduces the rejection rate to 
typical levels. 
A common concern about the strategy method is that stated WT As and actual 
accept/reject decisions, given specific offers, might differ because WTAs are inflated. 
Repeated play offers some clues suggesting this is false. Of the twenty-eight rejections 
which occur in the first four rounds, only ten lead to a reduction in the respondent's WT A 
in the next round. And in five of these ten cases the respondents raise their WTA's in 
subsequent rounds. Hence, there is not much evidence that respondents pick high WTAs 
and permanently revise them downward after rejections. 
VII. Conclusions
In this paper we studied a 3-player ultimatum bargaining game in which a proposer 
made offers dividing $10 with each of two respondents. Unlike in most other studies, all 
players had positive outside options which they earned if the proposer's offer was rejected. 
Respondents in standard two-player ultimatum games often reject positive offers, which 
suggests they compare their payoffs with the proposers' -- which psychologists call "social 
comparison"-- and sometimes prefer getting nothing to getting much less than the proposer 
does. Our design had two different respondents, each with different outside option values 
($2 and $4), to see if the respondents would compare their offers with other respondents' 
offers as well as with the proposer's share. 
Our findings and related research 
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In this section we summarize our two main findings and relate them to previous 
research. 
Fre!Juent disa�eernent and eg-ocentric assessment of fairness 
Our first main finding is that introducing outside options led to high rates of rejection of 
offers, around 50%, which were much larger than most previous studies.We suggest that 
self-serving or egocentric interpretations of the amount of surplus being divided provides 
an explanation for this effect. Of course, replication across different subject pools, using a 
more conservative one-treatment-at-a-time extension of the zero-option design, are 
necessary to establish whether this finding is robust. 
Manipulating common information about monetary payoffs is another way to study 
egocentric assessment. For example, in Kagel, Kirn, and Moser (in press), players 
ultimatum-bargain over divisions· of 100 chips which have different monetary conversion 
values for different players (following Roth & Murnighan, 1982). When the proposers 
have high chip values and respondents have low values (and both know this), the setting is 
ripe for egocentric assessment: Proposers offer a fair share of chips while respondents 
think they should get their fair share of dollars (which means lots more chips). Indeed, the 
rejection rate in this condition was 39%, close to our high rates. 
A second batch of papers report evidence of egocentric assessment of f airness in non­
ultirnaturn bargaining (see Carnerer & Loewenstein 1993). For example, Loewenstein & 
Thompson (1992) studied a two-person wage bargaining problem with escalating per­
period delay costs. Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Carnerer (in press) used an 
actual lawsuit adapted for experimental use, in which the facts of the case were sufficiently 
rich, and ambiguous, that both sides could come to believe the facts favored them. In both 
of these studies, the difference between two players' self-reported perceptions of what 
agreement is fair-- a measured gap in fairness-- was a significant predictor of the delay until 
settlement (and delay was financially costly to subjects). 
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These tales of egocentric assessment will sound ad hoc to many readers. Yet there are 
many demonstrations of such effects in psychology experiments (see Babcock et al, in 
press)-- and in readers' own lives?-- and it would be fruitful to develop the systematic 
principles underlying them more formally. The recipe seems to be: Construct a situation in 
which there are multiple ways of describing or "framing" the game. (Outside options 
provide two ways of defining surplus in our study, using chips provide two ways of 
valuing choices-- as chips or dollars-- in Kagel, Kim & Moser, and diverse information 
whose meaning or importance can be argued creates competing interpretations in Babcock 
et al). Now even if subjects agree on the same choice function, mapping alternative frames 
into a vector of outcomes, players' differing values for outcomes induce different 
preferences for frames. In a sense, players do not agree on the game they play and hence, 
standard arguments about when rational play leads to efficiency do not apply. Obviously, 
formal modeling along these lines would probably require replacing the Harsanyi "common 
prior" assumption or replacing the assumption that players update beliefs about states, 
based on new information, independently of the consequences of those states for them. 
Our results also tentatively suggest that previous research on ultimatum games, which 
always used zero outside options, may vastly understate disagreement rates in natural 
settings with outside options. Low disagreement rates are often used to inf er that while 
respondents may act "irrationally" (against self-interest) by rejecting small offers, 
proposers rationally make generous offers in order to maximize expected profits (obeying 
our hypothesis F"). Our data contradict this view: Most proposers offered too little, 
sacrificing a modest amount of expected profit by doing so, and only learned to raise their 
offers slowly across five trials of experience. Further studies of richer settings with more 
scope for egocentric assessment could help determine whether proposers' suboptimal 
behavior is really as common as in our studies, and how experience affects it. 
Social comparison 
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Our second main finding is that roughly half the subjects exhibited some kind of 
between-respondent social comparison, altering the amount they would accept from the 
proposer in response to the offer made to the other respondent. Proposers did not appear 
to expect these social comparisons, or did not care about them, since their offers hardly 
changed between the round 1 condition where respondents did not know offers made to 
others (so no between-respondent comparison was possible) and the round 2 condition in 
which they did. 
Some previous studies addressed the effects of social comparison indirectly, by varying 
information and the number of players. For example, Croson (1994) and Straub and 
Murnighan (in press) found that respondents accepted less when they did not know how 
much the proposers earned. These data, which are hardly surprising, show that 
respondents' social comparison with proposers' earnings causes rejections of offers. 
Gtith and van Damme (1994) studied three-player bargaining in which a proposer 
divides a stake three ways, between herself, an active respondent A, and a passive 
("dummy") respondent D. Only the active respondent A decides whether to accept or reject 
the offer. They varied what A knew about the offers to each player. Their study mixes 
elements of ultimatum and dictator games, since A can reject the offer but D cannot, and 
represents an interesting contrast to ours. 
When A knew all three players' shares or just her own offered share, proposers offered 
about 30% of the stake to A and much less, 5-10%, to D. When A knew only the offer to 
D, but not her own, the proposers tricked A by leaving 15-20% for D and much less for A. 
The proposers acted like A's would use the offer to D as a clue about the proposers' 
generosity, and the A's did. In all cases rejection rates were low (7% in total). 
These data are consistent with our general finding that respondents who care at all about 
other offers generally demand more (less) when other offers are higher (lower). The fact 
that A accepts generous offers to herself, knowing D gets very little, suggests A's 
satisfaction is increased by the low offers to D. 
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Roth et al ( 1991) study two-player ultimatum bargaining, and compare it with a 
monopoly market game in which nine buyers compete by making offers to a single seller, 
who either takes the most favorable off er or rejects it and earns nothing. In the two-player 
ultimatum games, respondents reject offers about half the time when 30% or less is 
offered. But in the nine-buyer market games, buyers compete vigorously by offering to 
accept only 20% of the surplus or, after ten rounds of repetition, less than 5%.16 Why do 
buyers accept so much less when competing with other buyers? 
A plausible answer is that the social comparisons differ in the two settings.17 In 
ultimatum bargaining, the single buyer can only compare herself with the seller, and rejects 
low offers because she dislikes comparing unfavorably with a seller who gets a lot more. 
But in the nine-buyer setting, each buyer can also compare herself with the other eight 
buyers, who earn nothing if their offers are rejected. Buyers then accept smaller surplus 
shares because knowing that eight other buyers earned nothing takes the sting out of 
earning much less than the seller did. 
Further Research 
There are many avenues for further interesting work. A natural extension is to 
methodically increase the number of players beyond three, offering more foci for social 
comparison, to see how people integrate multiple comparisons. The market game reported 
in Roth et al (1991) suggest that players will accept smaller and smaller shares of surplus if 
they know others like them are earning small shares (or earning nothing at all). Note how 
competitive, self-interested outcomes could then result if fair-minded players take solace in 
16 A related precursor result in economic experiments on monopoly pricing (e.g., Smith & Williams, 1990)
is that buyers attempt to drive prices down by withholding demand-- foregoing profitable acceptance of high 
prices posted by a monopoly seller. Sometimes such "boycotts" decay over time (as in Roth et al); other 
times buyers wear down the monopolist so prices and quantities approach the competitive point. 
17 A related fairness-based explanation is that buyers in the ultimatum game punish unfair sellers by
rejecting small offers, but buyers in the market game punish other buyers who behaved unfairly by 
undercutting them, by making still lower offers (e.g., Roth et al (p 1093, esp. fn 23). This explanation is 
plausible because the buyers' market offers fall across ten rounds, whereas respondent behavior does not 
generally change much across ten rounds in two-player experiments. Note how this sort of explanation can 
explain competitive, self-interested behavior resulting from fair-minded players. · 
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the fact that many others are treated equally unfairly. A different interpretation of this effect 
is that making many social comparisons quickly becomes complicated as the number of 
possible comparisons rises. People may solve this problem by ignoring everyone else and 
focussing on self-interest. (In that view, own-payoff maximization is a heuristic decision 
rule which approximates a more rational rule that is too hard to figure out.) 
A finding from previous studies is that when respondents do not know the proposer's 
share, so clear social comparison is impossible, they tend to accept less (often zero). 
Together, the combined effects of increasing the number of players and reducing 
information about their outcomes. may provide a psychologically-plausible answer to an 
important puzzle: Why do bargaining experiments exhibit a lot of f airness preference and 
substantial disagreement, while in market experiments efficiency is high and fairness 
appears to play no role in perturbing competitive equilibrium or inhibiting convergence? 
One answer is that in most market experiments, there are many other traders to compare 
one's earnings with, and (typically) little information about how much others are earning. 
Connecting these two domains-- two-person bargaining, and markets-- and exploring the 
separate influences of multiple social compadson and information in generating fairness 
preference, is a fundamental issue that lies at the heart of much economic analysis. 
Another direction is to expand the methods used to investigate fairness and its roots in 
social comparison. For example, a referee suggests asking subjects to express a preference 
for how they view the amount of surplus being divided (cf. Fischhoff 1983), to see if 
proposers and respondents really express different preferred views. One could also ask 
respondents whether they consider other respondents, or the proposer, more similar to 
them, or somehow measure the focus of their social comparison attention (perhaps using a 
computerized information display device, e.g., Camerer et al 1994). It cannot hurt to use 
some measurement techniques or treatment variables from social psychology in economic 
settings, adding them to standard experimental economics designs when it is easy and 
harmless to do so, to test theories of social compruison more precisely. 
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Finally, our results are tentative because our design has many departures from the 
standard ultimatum design. Each change-- using WT As, adding outside options, making 
the outside options asyrnrnetdc-- may increase the rejection rate a bit for different reasons, 
leading to a large overall increase in rejections. We are most cudous to study 3-player 
games with no options, and 2-player games with syrnrnetdc options, and use additional 
designs (e.g. footnote 5) to further isolate the source of social comparison effects. 
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Appendix: Instructions for 3-player Ultimatum Games 
Round 1 Instructions: In this experiment you will be either a proposer or a responder. The 
proposer has to decide how to divide up two ten dollar bills, one between responder 1 and 
him or herself, and the other between responder 2 and him or herself. 
The proposer makes an offer of X dollars, where X is divisible by 50 cents. If a 
responder accepts then the responder receives $X and the proposer receives $10 - $X. 
If the responder rejects the offer then both the responder and the proposer receive their 
outside options. The proposer's outside option is equal to $3.00 for each of the 10  dollar 
bills. (fhat is, if either one of the proposer's offers is rejected then the proposer receives 
$3.00; if both offers are rejected then the proposer receives $6.00. Responder 1 has an 
outside option equal to $2.00, while responder 2's outside option is equal to $4.00. 
One responder's acceptance or rejection of the offer he or she receives from the proposer 
does not affect the outcome of the offer made to the other responder. 
Please do not talk during the experiment (except to ask the experimenter questions). The 
proposer has two record sheets, one for responder 1 and another for responder 2. On the 
appropriate space the proposer will privately record his or her offer. While the proposer is 
deciding how much to offer the respondents should fill out their own sheets. On the 
respondent's sheets, you should indicate the minimum offer you would accept from the 
proposer. Then the experimenter will collect the proposer's offer sheet and hand each sheet 
to the appropriate respondent. If you are a respondent, you should check whether the offer 
the proposer makes is above or below the minimum off er you said you would accept. If 
the offer is above your minimum (or equal to it) you should circle "ACCEPT" on your 
sheet. If the offer is below your minimum you should circle "REJECT". The experimenter 
will then pick-up the record sheets. The offer that each responder receives and their 
decision to accept or reject should be kept private. 
There are two rounds in the experiment. Round 2 involves the same monetary stakes as 
round l ,  but the rules are slightly different. (We will explain the difference in rules when 
we reach round 2.) Each responder's acceptance decision will not be revealed to their 
respective proposer until the end of round 2. At the end of round 2 a coin will be flipped to 
determine whether you receive your payoffs from round 1 or round 2. You will receive 
the payoffs from one of the two rounds. The decisions you make may affect the money 
you earn substantially, so ask questions now if you have them. 
Round 2 Instructions: Round 2 is identical to round 1 except that the proposer's offers to 
each of the respective responders is public. That is, on the round 2 record sheet the 
proposer must record both of his or her offers on each of the responder record sheets. So 
each responder will know the value of the off er made to the other responder. 
Also, each responder must specify the minimum offer they will accept for each of the 
possible offers made to the other responder. If you are a responder you have received a 
table of numbers [see Table Al] . Each column in the table represents a possible offer made 
to the other responder, while each row represents a possible offer made to you. You 
should circle the number in each column which represents the minimum offer you will 
accept from the proposer given the offer made to the other responder, as represented by that 
column. 
Once the proposer makes his or her offers and you have determined the minimum offer 
you will accept for each of the possible offers made to the other responder, you will learn 
both the offer made to you and the offer made to the other responder. The number you 
circled in the column corresponding to the offer the other responder received determines 
3 1  
your decision to accept or reject. If the offer is greater than or equal to the number you 
circled then you accept, if it is less then you reject. If you accept then you receive the value 
of the offer, if you reject you receive your outside option - $2.00 if you are responder 1 ,  
$4.00 if you are responder 2 .  Note that the other responder's decision to accept or reject 
their offer does not affect your payoffs. 
At the end of the round a coin will be flipped to determined whether your final earnings 
in the experiment correspond to your round 1 earnings or your round 2 earnings. 
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OFFER 
MADE 
10 
4 4 . 5  
2 2 
2 . 5 2 . 5  
3 3 
3 . 5 3 . 5  
4 4 
4 . 5 4 . 5  
5 5 
5 . 5 5·. 5 
6 6 
6 . 5 6 . 5  
7 7 
Table 
A1  
Offer Made to Respondent 2 
5 5 . 5  6 
2 2 2 
2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5 
3 3 3 
3 . 5  3 . 5 3 . 5 
4 4 4 
4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5 
5 5 5 
5 . 5  5 . 5  5 . 5 
6 6 6 
6 . 5  6 . 5  6 . 5 
7 7 7 
Each column represents an offer the proposer may make to 
respondent 2.  Each row represents an offer the proposer may 
make to you. For each of the possible offers the proposer may 
offer repondent 2 circle the minimum offer you would be 
will ing to accept from the proposer. So you should circle one 
num ber in  each column.  
When you receive an offer the number you circled in the 
column corresponding to the offer respondent 2 received wil l  
determine you decision to accept or reject. If the offer is 
g reater than or equal to the number you circled then you 
accept, if is less then you reject. 
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6 . 5  7 
2 2 
2 . 5 2 . 5  
3 3 
3 . 5 3 . 5 
4 4 
4 . 5  4 . 5 
5 5 
5 . 5  5 . 5 
6 6 
6 . 5 6 . 5 
7 7 
Subj .  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
•7 
8 
9 
1 0 
1 1 
1 2 
1 3 
1 4 
1 5 
1 6 
1 7 
1 8 
1 /9 
2 0  
4 
3 . 5  
3 
3 
2 
2 . 5  
2 . 5  
3 . 5  
4 
2 . 5  
4 
2 
5 
5 
4 . 5  
2 . 5  
4 
2 . 5  
2 . 5  
4 
6 
Table i 
Offer Made to Respondent 2 
4 . 5  5 5 . 5  6 6 . 5  7 
4 4 . 5  5 5 . 5  6 6 . 5  
3 . 5  4 4 . 5  5 5 . 5  6 
3 . 5  4 4 . 5  5 5 . 5  6 
2 . 5  3 3 . 5  4 4 . 5  5 
3 3 . 5  4 4 . 5  5 5 . 5  
2 . 5  3 3 . 5  4 4 . 5  5 
4 4 . 5  4 . 5  5 5 5 
4 . 5  5 5 5 4 . 5  4 . 5  
2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  
4 4 4 4 4 4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  
2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  
4 4 4 4 4 4 
2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  
2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 5  
4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 . 5  5 4 . 5  4 4 4 
mean 3 . 4 2 5 3 .  5 7 5 3 .  7 5 3 .  8 7 5 4 .  0 2 5 4 .  1 5 4 .  3 
Each row correspond/s to a particular respondent 1 's WTA 
conditional on an offer made to respondent 2, as designated 
by each colu mn.  
· 
The far right column is the slope coefficient from the 
regression WTA = a +  bOffer. 
* p<.0 1 
1 * 
1 * 
1 * 
1 * 
1 * 
0 . 8 9 *  
0 . 5 *  
0 . 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 . 7 *  
s ubj . 2 2 . 5  3 
1 4 4 4 
2 4 4 4 . 5  
3 4 5 5 
4 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 
6 4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  
w 7 7 7 7 
T 8 5 . 5  5 5 
A 9 4 4 4 
1 0 4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  
1 1 5 5 5 
1 2 4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  
1 3 5 5 5 
1 4 5 4 . 5  5 . 5  
1 5 5 5 5 
1 6 . 6  6 6 
1 7 6 . 5  6 5 . 5  
1 8 7 7 7 
1 9 7 6 . 5  6 
2 0  7 7 6 
Table 1 
Offer Made · to Respondent 1 
3 . 5  4 4 . 5  5 5 5 
4 4 4 . 5  5 5 . 5  
4 . 5  5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 . 5  6 . 5  
5 5 5 5 5 . 5  
5 5 5 5 5 . 5  
5 5 5 5 . 5  5 . 5  
6 6 6 7 7 
5 5 5 5 5 
4 4 4 4 4 
4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  
5 5 5 5 5 
4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  
5 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 . 5  5 4 . 5  
5 4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  4 . 5  
6 5 . 5  5 . 5 5 . 5  5 . 5  
5 5 5 5 5 
6 . 5  6 . 5  6 . 5  6 . 5  6 . 5  
5 . 5  5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 5 5 
6 6 5 
6 6 . 5  
6 6 . 5  
6 . 5  6 . 5  
6 6 . 5  
6 6 . 5  
5 5 
7 7 
5 5 
4 4 
4 . 5  4 . 5  
5 5 
4 . 5  4 . 5  
5 5 
4 4 . 5  
4 . 5  4 . 5  
5 . 5  5 
5 5 
6 6 
5 5 
5 5 
7 
7 
7 
6 . 5  
7 
7 
6 
7 
6 
4 
4 . 5  
5 
4 . 5  
5 
5 
4 . 5  
5 
5 
5 . 5  
5 
5 
b 
0 . 6 4 *  
0 . 5 5 *  
0 . 4 4 *  
0 . 3 6 *  
0 . 3 6 *  
0 . 2 3 *  
0 . 05 
0 . 0 5  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 0 .  1 
- 0 . 1 2 * 
- 0 . 2 1  * 
- 0 . 2 4 *  
- 0 . 2 6 *  
- 0 . 3 6 *  
- 0 . 4 4 *  
mean 5 . 2 7 5  5 . 2 2 5  5 . 2  5 . 1 2 5 5 . 0 7 5  5 . 1 2 5 5 . 1 75 5 . 2 2 5  5 . 2 7 5  5 . 375 5 . 5 7 5  
Each row con-espond�s to a particular respondent 2's WT A 
conditional on an offer made to respondent 1 ,  as designated 
by each column.  
The far right col umn i s  the slope coefficient from the 
regression WTA = a +  bOffer. 
* p<.0 1 
Table 3: Offers and WTAs in 3- and 2-player ultimatum games 
Statistic 
mean 
median 
std.dev. 
Offers in 3-player 
games (n=20) 
to R I  to R2 
3.63 4.90 
3.00 5.00 
1 . 10 .45 
WTAs in 
Offers in 2-player 
games (n= I5) 
to R I  to R2 
3.80 4.66 
4.00 4.50 
1 .20 .49 
WTAs in 
Offers in 2-player 
POR games (n=23) 
to R I  
4.37 
4.00 
.68 
WT As in 2-player 
3-player game (n = 20) 2-player game (n = 15) POR games (n=24) 
Statistic R I  WfA R2 WfA R I  WTA R2 WTA R I  WTA 
mean 3.86 5.28 4.27 4.96 3.88 
median 4.00 5.00 4.50 5.00 4.00 
std. dev. 1 .26 .63 . .  92 .61 1 . 19 
rejection rate 45% 55% 45% 48% 38% . 
Table 4 :  Stat istics Testing Hypotheses of Distributi ona l Equa l ity 
( offers upper right , WTAs lower left ) 
3 players 
2 players 
Rl ( $2 option) 
number of players 
__ 3_ __2_ 
. 1 3 , . 2 3 
2 6 , 1 . 5 5 
R4 ( $4 option) 
number of players 
_3_ __2 _ 
. 18 , 2 . 5 4 
. 18 , 18 . 02 °  
R l  ( $2 option) only 
2 + 3 -player 
pooled POR 
learning trials 
Round 1 Round 5 
2+3 pooled 
POR . 1 5 , 5 . 7 3 
Round 1 . 17 , 1 . 3 8 
Round 5 . 1 5 , . 0 1 
a b o p< . 1 0 ,  p< . 0 5 ,  p< . 0 1 
. 04 ,  . 0 1 
. 09 , 1 5 . 19 °  
. 2 2 , 1 . 2 8 
. 6 0 ° , 3 1 .  6 7 °  
. 07 , . 0 0 
. 2 5 , 3 . 7 9 
. 3 7 , 1 6 . 1 0° 
. 4 0a , 7 1 .  2 0° 
Note : Table g ives Kolmogorov-Smirnov test-statistic ( largest distribut ion of 
sample cdf ' s ) f irst , followed by Epps-S ingleton stat istic ( di stributed chi �  
squared with 4 dof , us ing J=2 and t= . 4 ) . 
round 1 
WTA offe r 
mean 3 . 8 7  3 . 4 3  
median 4 3 
std.dev. 1 . 2 5  0 . 8 4 
'"lo r e ' .  0 . 4 7  
* 1 5  pairs in each round 
Table 5' 
Repeated 2-player Ulnmatum games* 
Respondent 1 Case 
round 2 round 3 round 4 
WTA offer  WTA offe r WTA offe r  
3 . 7 3  3 . 4 3  3 . 9 7  3 . 6 7  3 . 7 7  3 . 7 3 
4 3 4 . 5  3 . 5  3 . 5  4 
1 . 0 7  0 . 7 5  1 . 2 2  0 . 8 4 1 . 2 4  0 . 6 8  
0 . 4  0 . 6 6  0 . 4 7  
round 5 
WTA offe r 
3 . 9 7 3 . 9  
4 . 5  4 
1 . 2 5  0 .  7 1  
0 . 4 7  
1 
0 . 9  
0 . 8  
0 . 7  
C1I ..... 
� 0 . 6  
c: 
.!:? 0 . 5  ..... 0 C1I 
'Ci) 0 . 4  .... 
0 . 3  
0 . 2  
0 . 1  
0 
Figure 1 
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Conditional Rejection Rates 
For Respondent 2 
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Frequency of Offers and WTAs for R 1  
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